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Abstract— Malware attacks on the Internet have increased 
substantially in recent years for which botnets are a root 
cause. A "botnet" is a network of compromised computers 
controlled by an attacker known as the "botmaster". To be 
able to effectively detect and defend against botnets, it is very 
important to have a good understanding of their construction 
procedure and propagation methodology. In this work, we 
study the construction of an unstructured peer-to-peer 
botnet, its propagation methodology, diurnal properties and 
robustness. This simulation shows that the more frequently a 
node updates its buddy list, the lesser is the process overhead 
involved. 
Kata Kunci. botnet, peer-to-peer.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, malware attacks on the Internet have 
increased substantially. Attacks such as phishing, e-mail 
spamming, keylogging, click fraud and Distributed Denial 
of Service (DDoS) are common on the Internet today for 
which botnets are the root cause [1-3]. A botnet is a 
network of compromised computers called bots controlled 
by a remote attacker called botmaster. 
Most botnets have a Centralized Command and Control 
(C&C) architecture in which the bots directly connect to 
servers called C&C servers. These C&C servers receive 
commands from the botmaster and forward them to the 
bots in the network. However, these C&C servers are the 
primary weak points in the botnet architectures. The 
botmaster will lose control over the botnet if the C&C 
servers are shut down by the defenders. 
Considering the weakness in the architecture of 
centralized botnets, some attackers use a peer-to-peer 
architecture for their botnets. This is done in order to avoid 
centralized C&C and make it difficult for the defenders to 
detect and shut down the botnet. A buddy list is a list of 
hosts that a host wants to keep track of. Each host then 
connects to other hosts that are in its buddy list. The 
attacker only has to send his commands to a few of these 
hosts and each host will propagate these commands to their 
buddies. Thus, by becoming one of the peers, the attacker 
can broadcast his commands over the entire network. 
The goal of this work is to understand the creation of the 
botnet architecture, study the diurnal dynamics and 
robustness of the botnet as well as the process overhead 
involved in the generation and updating of buddy lists. We 
have also studied the propagation time for the attack 
commands to spread to all the bots in the botnet. Our work 
would help defenders develop effective detection and 
response systems for botnets. 
We simulated an unstructured peer-to-peer botnet to 
study the aforesaid features with the aim of better 
understanding of how botnets work. Our work is organized 
as follows: Section 2 describes the related work, Section 3 
presents the system model that we use in this simulation, 
Section 4 shows our experimental design, and Section 5 
presents the results of our simulation whereas Section 6 
and 7 discusses the conclusion and the future work. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
In recent years, botnets have become an active research 
topic. This section reviews the related works about botnets 
that we use as our reference in creating the simulation for 
this project. 
Puri provided an overview of botnets in [4], which 
introduced botnets, some related terms as well as attacks 
that the botnet could perform. 
In 2005, The Honeypot Project presented more details 
about botnet commands such as DDoS, bot spreading and 
downloading files from the Internet [5] using a botnet. 
Wang et al. [6] proposed an advanced hybrid peer-to-
peer botnet which, compared to current botnets is harder to 
shut down, monitored or hijacked. Vogt et al. [7] developed 
a simulation to show the attack effectiveness of many small 
botnets compared to one large botnet. 
Steggink and Idziejczak [8] discussed three topologies 
used by botnets: centralized, decentralized and hybrid. 
They also analyzed the bot infection mechanisms and their 
behaviors in the test environment. Dagon et al. [9] 
discussed the diurnal properties in botnet activity using 
which they compared botnet propagation rates so as to 
prioritize responses 
Chu et al. [10] discussed the population dynamics in 
peer-to-peer networks which showed that the availability of 
nodes was strongly influenced by the time of the day and 
most users tended to be available for short contiguous 
periods of time. Bhagwan et al. [11] provided an overview 
of the availability of peer-to-peer systems. Lua et al. [12] 
compared various structured and unstructured peer-to-peer 
networks. 
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Figure1. Example of an unstructured peer- to-peer network 
 
Figure 2. Node availability as a function of the hour of the 
day (Source: [10]) 
Our work studies the construction, robustness and the 
diurnal dynamics of botnets as well as the underlying 
process overhead involved which would enable defenders 
to develop effective detection and response systems.  
III. SYSTEM MODEL 
In this section, we present the system model used in our 
simulation. We simulate an unstructured peer-to-peer 
network such as the one shown in Figure 1 in which the 
buddy list of each peer is constructed by a random process. 
We limit the neighbors of each peer to at most ten.  
Our  bot  model  is  based  on  Phatbot [13] which  uses  
a peer-to-peer  network  structure based on  Gnutella to  
receive  commands  and send information. Since there is no 
server, the infected hosts have to find each other 
individually.  This  is  accomplished  by utilizing  Gnutella 
cache  servers – anyone can use the CGI  scripts provided 
by these servers to  register  themselves  as  a   Gnutella  
client [13].  However,  in  our  simulation  each  bot will  
have  a  buddy  list  of  its  neighbors.  The buddy  list  will  
be  created  using  a  random process  to  choose  up  to  ten  
neighbors  for  each infected host. 
In  our  simulation,  after  the  initial  botnet construction,    
an  infected  host  will  check  its neighbors  every  20,  15, 
10  and  5  minutes  to see  whether  they  are  alive  or  not.  
If  five  or fewer  neighbors  are  alive,  the  infected  host  
will  replace  its  non-active  neighbors  with  other  hosts  
that  are  not  listed  in  the  buddy list and have been 
infected. 
Each  host  in  the  peer-to-peer  network  will frequently  
leave  and  join  the  network. According to Chu et al.  [10], 
the online population of a botnet is strongly affected by the 
time of the day.  A small percentage of nodes are available 
for downloads at any instant: 31% of the time nodes were 
available for only about a 10-minute period before 
becoming unavailable again.  The  result  of  this  
experiment  which  we  used  for  our simulation is shown 
in Figure 2. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
In order to study the botnet topology and its robustness 
through simulations, we first need to determine the 
simulation settings.  
In our  simulation, we  assume  that the botnet has  a  
potential  vulnerable  population  of 15,000 but  stops 
growing  after  it  reaches  the size  of 10,000. The botnet 
topology is created the first time the simulation runs. 
Subsequently,  each  infected  host  will  check  its 
neighbors  every  20, 15,  10 and  5  minutes of  simulation  
time  respectively  to  determine whether  they are alive or  
not. If five  or fewer neighbors  are  alive,  the  infected  
host  will replace  its  non-active  neighbors  with  other 
infected hosts that are not in its buddy list.  
We did two types of simulation for our research.  In  the  
first  experiment  called Dynamic  Population  Simulation,  
we  observed the  botnet  population  behavior  and  the 
process  overhead  involved  in  the  creation and  updating  
of  buddy  lists.  We  ran  this simulation  ten  times  for  
20,  15,  10  and  5 minutes  of  simulation  time  and  took  
the median  value  of  the  results  to  arrive  at  the 
conclusions. In  the  second experiment called Attack  
Command  Simulation  we  observed  the time  taken  for  
the  propagation  of  attack commands to all the live bots in 
the botnet. 
A. Dynamic Population Simulation 
In this experiment, we observe the dynamic process of 
the construction of the botnet topology and the process of 
addition of new neighbors by an infected host. In our 
simulation there are 10,000 infected hosts and 5,000 
uninfected hosts. For the purpose of our simulation, we do 
not cover the primary infection procedure and assume that 
10,000 hosts are already infected. 
As soon as the simulation is run the topology is 
automatically constructed after which the infected hosts 
will check their neighbors every 20, 15, 10 and 5 minutes. 
If five or fewer neighbors are alive, it will try to add other 
infected hosts as its neighbors. For the purpose of our 
simulation, we limit each peer to have at most 10 
neighbors. The diurnal dynamics of the botnet are 
simulated based on data presented in Chu et al. [10] which 
states that nodes are available only for about 10 minute 
periods before beco ming unavailable again. Moreover, at 
any instant a maximum of only 5% nodes are available. 
This experiment also measures the process overhead 
involved during the construction of the botnet topology and 
updating of the buddy list by every node. 
B. Attack Command Simulation 
In this we observe the time required for the propagation 
of commands to all the live bots in the botnet. One of the 
current live, infected bot will be randomly chosen to 
initiate the command propagation process. The commands 
will be propagated to all the live and infected bots through 
the buddy list of each node. 
V. RESULT 
In this section, we present the results of our 
simulation. 
Figure 3 depicts the diurnal dynamics of the botnet 
over a 24 hour time period. The results confirm the 
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Figure 3. Percentage of Live Botnet Population over a 24 hour 
period 
 
Figure 4: Graph depicting the process overhead while building the 
botnet topology 
 
Figure 5: Percentage of Nodes in the Botnet that receive 
Commands 
statistics presented in [10] which show that the diurnal 
properties of the botnet are strongly influenced by the time 
of the day and a maximum of only 5% nodes are active at 
any instant. It can be inferred from the graph that the 
maximum botnet population is during the second half of 
the day. 
Since every node in a peer-to-peer botnet has to 
frequently update its buddy list, the process overhead 
involved is of prime concern. Figure 4 depicts the process 
overhead involved when each node in the botnet updates 
its buddy list every 20, 15, 10 and 5 minutes.  
The results show that the more frequently a node 
updates its buddy list, the lesser is the process overhead 
involved. Our simulation results show that the process 
overhead involved is the minimum when every node in the 
botnet updates its buddy list every 5 minutes. 
Figure 5 depicts the time needed for the propagation of 
commands to all the live bots in the botnet. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
In this work, we study the construction of an 
unstructured peer-to-peer botnet topology and its 
robustness with the help of simulations. From our work, we 
can conclude that the process overhead in a peer-to-peer 
botnet will be significantly lower if the bots in the botnet 
update their buddy lists frequently. We also observe that 
the diurnal dynamics of the botnet are strongly influenced 
by the time of the day. Therefore it can be inferred that the 
botnet is in its most vulnerable state when it is initially 
constructed and before its buddy list updating procedure is 
run for the first time. 
 
VII. FUTURE WORK  
Future work should study the topology building 
procedure and robustness of peer-to-peer botnets by 
increasing the total vulnerable population of the botnet, 
infected population of the botnet and the number of 
buddies of each host. The resiliency of botnets should also 
be studied by classifying the bots in a peer-to-peer botnet 
into servant bots and client bots [6] and then performing 
the buddy list updating procedure. 
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